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When Trust Becomes Deference

When Trust Becomes Deference
9:17

On November 12, Jensen Huang resigned as CEO of Nvidia, the company he co-founded in 1993 and led for 33 years. The immediate cause was personal. Reports described extramarital relationships, including one with an employee who reported to him and one with a woman officials reportedly suspect of spying for China. Nvidia's stock fell as much as 16% that morning before closing down about 4%. That came on top of a slide of more than 20% over the previous month.

Much of the coverage has focused on the scandal. Boards of trustees, and the heads who work with them, should focus on something else. In the days between the first reports and the resignation, investors, analysts, and governance experts kept asking one question: What is Nvidia without Jensen Huang? Unfortunately, no one had a ready answer.

That is the lesson for independent schools.

How deference becomes a structure

Most heads of school are not founders, and few boards will face a crisis like Nvidia's. But a head who has transformed a school often holds a similar place in its story, and the pattern that matters here is familiar. Huang's success earned him three decades of deference, and over time that deference reshaped the company around him.

He dismissed conventional succession planning and kept roughly 60 direct reports. One governance expert argued that the board had let the company organize itself around a single person.

This same dynamic happens in schools.

Why success is the risky moment

A head arrives at a school that is struggling, or simply drifting. Over ten or fifteen years, they rebuild enrollment, raise money for new buildings, recruit a strong faculty, and change how the school sees itself. The board is rightly grateful, and it starts, understandably, to step back.

The problem is that a thriving school sends no warning signals. Enrollment is strong, the annual fund is up, and faculty are staying. Every good number looks like evidence that the board should defer. Trust the head has earned slides into deference by default. Oversight is most likely to lapse just when it seems least necessary.

Schools don't have a stock price, but they have equivalents: re-enrollment, inquiries, annual fund participation, faculty retention, and major gifts. When a school’s identity is so completely wrapped around the head and then that head departs, those are the numbers that fall.

The trigger doesn't have to be a scandal. Heads leave because of illness, a better offer, burnout, family circumstances, or death. The board can't predict which. Its job is to make sure the school can withstand any of them.

Keeping a great head

None of this means boards should trust a strong head less. It means they should trust in a more mature way. Boards that want to keep exceptional leaders should do four things.

Treat evaluation as respect. A strong head deserves a board that engages with them as a peer. No formal evaluation or a rubber-stamp review tells a head they have moved beyond accountability. That isolates them and isolation is where judgment erodes.

Invest in the head's sustainability. That means sabbaticals, coaching, a capable leadership team, and a contract that reflects their value. Burnout is a succession risk too, and one the board can do something about.

Keep the chair relationship candid. The best heads want a chair who will tell them hard things in private. Make that the norm early, while it's easy, so it's still there when it's hard.

Make succession part of the head's legacy. A head whose school thrives after they leave has done more than one whose school stumbles without them. Framed that way, building a bench is an achievement for the head, not a threat to them.

Protecting the school

Keeping a great head and protecting the school are not competing goals. Six practices serve both.

1. An emergency succession plan, reviewed every year. Who leads tomorrow if the head is gone tonight? Who speaks to the community, and what do they say? Nvidia's board had to answer these questions in front of the market. A school's board should answer them in an executive session, long before they're needed. Early on in my own leadership tenure, we had discussions at the board level about key-person risk and we developed a plan not only for my sudden departure – should that ever happen – but division and key department heads, too. It’s about building sustainable structures rather than relying on personalities.

2. A bench with real authority. Many independent schools have no assistant or associate head. The CFO, the division heads, and the leaders of enrollment and advancement report directly to the head. That structure is common and it can work well. The risk lies elsewhere. If none of those leaders holds real authority, and the board barely knows them, everything runs through one person.

Start with a simple question: Who is in charge when the head is off campus? At many schools the answer is still the head, who is "always available by phone." That may be read as dedication, but ultimately it is not a plan. Formally designate a senior leader who is on duty when the head is away, with the authority to act. Give the leadership team genuine decision rights in their own areas. Make sure trustees know them through committee work and presentations to the board.

Governance experts commenting on Nvidia noted that succession works best as a relay, passed to leaders the organization has watched in action over time. In a school, that means leaders families, faculty, and trustees already trust.

3. Board leadership that stays independent. Watch for the drift: trustees recruited almost exclusively by the head, a chair who is the head's close friend, a committee on trustees that always follows the head's preferences. Early on in my leadership tenure I was lucky enough to have a trustee who had served on many boards – higher ed, non-profit organizations, and publicly held companies. He was also the CFO of MIT. He took me aside one day and recommended that we have an executive session without me at the end of each board meeting. He advised it should be routine so that holding one would not signal alarm to me or to board members. We’ve now followed this pattern for almost 20 years. At the conclusion of our board meetings, the board chair along with another board member meets with me to clearly convey what the board needs from me before the next meeting. This process is structured, common, and effective.

4. Key relationships held by more than one person. Major donors, alumni leaders, and influential families should have real relationships with trustees and other administrators, not just with the head. If every significant gift depends on one person, the school carries key-person risk on its balance sheet.

5. A school story that belongs to the institution. Even in Nvidia's case, one market analyst argued that its lasting strength lies in its software, developer tools, and supply commitments, not in one person's charisma. A school's equivalents are its program, its faculty culture, and its traditions. It’s important to recognize great work, but notice when the school's story is told mostly through the head ("Under Dr. X's leadership...") and deliberately strengthen the institutional version.

6. Conduct policies that reach the top. Rules on reporting lines and relationships with subordinates should apply plainly to the head. Whistleblower channels should lead to the board chair or a designated board member, not through the head's office.

The test

One question tells a board where it stands: If our head left tomorrow, would the community's first question be "Who's next?" or "What happens to the school?" If it's the first, the board has done its job. If it's the second, the board has deferred too far.

Four more questions are worth asking in executive session:

  • Could five trustees each name two internal leaders the community would follow through an interim year?
  • When did we last discuss succession?
  • Do our ten largest donors have meaningful relationships with anyone besides the head?
  • Have we ever disagreed with the head about something that mattered? If not, is that because they're always right, or because we've stopped looking?

Trust is not the same as deference

Nvidia's board did not go wrong by trusting Jensen Huang. It went wrong by letting that trust take the place of the slower work of making the company bigger than any one person. Trust is a judgment the board keeps making. Deference is what's left when it stops.

The heads who transform schools deserve boards that recognize what they've built. The best way to honor that work is to make sure it lasts beyond them. A school that can withstand losing its head is not a sign that the head mattered less. It is evidence that the head built something real. For heads, that is the case for welcoming these practices rather than resisting them. For boards, it is the reason to insist on them.